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COLLOQUIUM
THE VARIED ROLES, REGULATION,
AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES
OF GOVERNMENT LAWYERS
LAWYERS IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE—
A FOREWORD
Bruce A. Green*
Lawyers in government serve in many different roles, both
representational and nonrepresentational. Some represent the federal, state,
or local government, a particular governmental entity (such as a department
of consumer affairs) or agency (such as the NLRB), or public officials in their
official capacity. These lawyers render a range of legal services and act as
litigators, negotiators, drafters, and counselors. Other lawyers in government
serve in nonrepresentative capacities; for example, as elected or appointed
officials or as their aides. Scholarship on government lawyers addresses
these varied roles and functions from varied perspectives, drawing on
different bodies of law and legal theory.
The eight articles in this collection could not possibly cover the full range
of government lawyers’ work, but they do range widely, addressing
government lawyers’ roles as legal advisors1 and policy advisors,2 as agency
officials3 and agency counsel,4 as state and federal attorneys general,5 and as
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criminal prosecutors6 and civil enforcement lawyers.7 Two of the writings
offer historical perspectives.8 Others illuminate the work of contemporary
government lawyers—for example, Stephen Lee and Sameer Ashar study
federal immigration lawyers in the Obama administration,9 while Peter
Margulies explores what he calls “lifeboat lawyering” in the Trump
administration.10
These writings make interesting individual contributions while also
addressing common concerns, the most prominent being government
lawyers’ discretion. The writings belie the concept of government lawyers’
work as ministerial or purely technocratic.11 As Lee and Ashar demonstrate,
government lawyers exercise discretion across a range of lawyering roles and
professional services.12 And how they exercise it, whether in giving advice,
enforcing the law, or otherwise, has significant public impact. Consider
Daniel Ernst’s account of Jerome Frank’s work as general counsel of the
Agricultural Adjustment Administration in the Roosevelt administration:
through their interpretation of the law, Ernst illustrates, government lawyers
can significantly influence or restrict the agencies within which they work
and the officials with whom they work.13 Or consider Lisa Grumet’s
discussion of state attorneys general who file amicus briefs seeking to
invalidate laws similar to those adopted by their own state legislatures:
government lawyers have opportunities not only to carry out the legislative
will but, as in this example, to frustrate it.14
On balance, these studies suggest that government lawyers’ discretion is
necessary, even if subject to abuse. One question they explore is how to
protect government lawyers’ independence from the inappropriate influence
of the partisan political officials under whom they serve. Rebecca Roiphe
and I envision professional conduct rules and other professional norms as
sources of federal prosecutors’ professional independence,15 and Peter
Margulies likewise underscores the importance of federal government
lawyers’ fidelity to unwritten norms that government officials may
disregard.16 Pointing to political cronies whom presidents have sometimes
appointed to serve as their attorneys general, Jed Shugerman argues that
federal prosecutors need greater structural independence from the president
the U.S. Attorney General as a Case for Structural Independence, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 1965
(2019).
6. Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe, May Federal Prosecutors Take Direction from
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in order to protect against “partisanship, self-dealing, and cronyism.”17
Melissa Mortazavi similarly emphasizes the need for institutional structures
to bolster, not undermine, government lawyers’ professional independence.18
If government lawyers are not mechanistically implementing elected
officials’ direction but are exercising power and discretion in meaningful
ways in their own right, then what makes their exercise of authority
legitimate and how are they to be held accountable? Brad Wendel and
Melissa Mortazavi each explore this question.19 Wendel says that it is not
enough for government lawyers to claim to act in “the public interest”—at
least not in accordance with their own personal conceptions of the public
interest—because “[l]awyers in general do not have privileged access to
knowledge of the common good.”20 But government lawyers’ exercise of
discretion may find legitimacy through their commitment to the rule of law
and their employment of accepted professional conventions for interpreting
the law21 and for enforcing it.22 And institutional cultures can support
government lawyers’ commitment to professional norms.23
My thanks to each of the authors both for contributing their writings to this
collection and for previously presenting their works in progress at the
Colloquium on The Varied Roles, Regulation, and Professional
Responsibilities of Government Lawyers at Fordham University School of
Law on October 12, 2018. This Colloquium was the most recent in almost a
quarter-century of collaborations between the Fordham Law Review and the
Stein Center for Law and Ethics around themes of significance to the legal
profession. This time, we were joined in organizing the Colloquium by
Rebecca Roiphe, who directs New York Law School’s Institute for
Professional Ethics, Brad Wendel of Cornell Law School, and Ellen
Yaroshefsky, who directs Hofstra Law School’s Freedman Institute for the
Study of Legal Ethics. My thanks to them as well as to Kathleen Clark and
Lisa Fairfax who presented additional works in progress on government
lawyers at the Colloquium. And most especially, I am grateful to the student
editors and staff of the Fordham Law Review for their characteristically
sterling editorial contributions to this collection.
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